Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting
Edith Elkind‚ Svetlana Obraztsova and Nicholas Teh
Abstract
We study a model of multiwinner voting where candidates are selected sequentially in rounds over a time horizon. Prior work has adapted popular notions of justified representation as well as voting rules that provide strong representation guarantees from the standard single-round multiwinner election case to the temporal setting. In our work, we focus on the complexity of verifying whether a given outcome is proportional. We show that the temporal setting is strictly harder than the standard single-round model of multiwinner voting, but identify natural special cases that enable efficient verification.
Address
Richland‚ SC
Book Title
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
ISBN
9798400704864
Keywords
computational social choice‚ proportionality‚ temporal voting
Location
‚ Auckland‚ New Zealand‚
Pages
2246–2248
Publisher
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Series
AAMAS '24
Year
2024