Accepted Papers

• Tamas Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Akihisa Tamura and Alexander Teytelboym.
  Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts

• Zhentao Li and Adrian Vetta.
  The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems

• Paul Goldberg and Francisco Javier Marmolejo Cossio.
  Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Game-theoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries

• Elliot Anshelevich and Wennan Zhu.
  Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems given Candidate Positions

• Kitty Meeks and Baharak Rastegari.
  Stable Marriage with Groups of Similar Agents

• Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong.
  Pricing Multi-Unit Markets

• Amir Ban.
  Strategy-Proof Incentives for Predictions

• Evdokia Nikolova, Ger Yang and Emmanouil Pountourakis.
  Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-loving Agents

• Tami Tamir.
  Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems

• Chi-Jen Lu.
  The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphs

• Robert Scheffler, Martin Strehler and Laura Vargas Koch.
  Equilibria in routing games with edge priorities

• Darya Melnyk, Yuyi Wang and Roger Wattenhofer.
  Byzantine Preferential Voting

• Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Christos Tzamos.
  Combinatorial Assortment Optimization

• Christian Saile and Warut Suksompong.
  Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments

• Meena Jagadeesan and Alexander Wei.
  Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets

• Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala and Kangning Wang.
  A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer

• Shuchi Chawla, Seffi Naor, Debmalya Panigrahi, Mohit Singh and Seeun William Umboh.
  Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games

• Nikhil Garg, Ashish Goel and Benjamin Plaut.
  Markets for Public Decision-making

• Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Keyu Zhu.
  Optimal Pricing For MHR Distributions

• Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka and Nicolas Stier-Moses.
  Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets

• Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie and Ariel D. Procaccia.
  The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy

• Moshe Babaioff and Sigal Oren.
  Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models

• Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos and Paul Spirakis.
  Approximating the Existential Theory of the Reals

• Vijay Menon and Kate Larson.
  Robust and Approximately Stable Marriages under Partial Information

• Pooya Jalaly and Eva Tardos.
  Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations

• Vasilis Kontonis, Dimitris Fotakis, Stratis Skoulakis and Vardis Kandiros.
  Opinion Dynamics with Limited Information

• Chamsi Hssaine and Siddhartha Banerjee.
  Information Signal Design for Incentivizing Team Formation

• Shant Boodaghians.
  Revealed Preference Dimension via Matrix Sign Rank

• Vijay Kamble.
  Revenue Management on an On-Demand Service Platform

• Mohit Hota and Sanjiv Kapoor.
  Equilibrium and Inefficiency in Multi-Product Cournot Games

• Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi and Ali Shameli.
  Prophet Inequalities vs. Approximating Optimum Online

• Hannah Li, Anilesh Krishnaswamy, Vijay Kamble and Ramesh Johari.
  Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation for Collaborative Work

• Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy and Ashish Goel.
  Implementing the Lexicographic Maxmin Bargaining Solution

• Ziwei Ji, Ruta Mehta and Matus Telgarsky.
  Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences

• Guy Avni, Thomas Henzinger and Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen.
  Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games

• Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubiński.
  How to hide in a network?