Abheek Ghosh : Publications
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[02]
Indexability is Not Enough for Whittle: Improved‚ Near−Optimal Algorithms for Restless Bandits
Abheek Ghosh‚ Dheeraj Nagaraj‚ Manish Jain and Milind Tambe
In Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 2023.
arXiv:2211.00112
Details about Indexability is Not Enough for Whittle: Improved‚ Near−Optimal Algorithms for Restless Bandits | BibTeX data for Indexability is Not Enough for Whittle: Improved‚ Near−Optimal Algorithms for Restless Bandits
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[1]
Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
Edith Elkind‚ Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg
In Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics (WINE). Pages 554. 2021.
arXiv:2109.03179
Details about Contest Design with Threshold Objectives | BibTeX data for Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
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[3]
Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation
Edith Elkind‚ Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg
In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Vol. 36. No. 5. Pages 4975–4982. 2022.
arXiv:2202.12594
Details about Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation | BibTeX data for Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation
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[4]
Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy
Edith Elkind‚ Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg
In Proceedings of the Symposium in Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). 2022.
arXiv:2207.08151
Details about Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy | BibTeX data for Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy
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[5]
Contests to Incentivize a Target Group
Edith Elkind‚ Abheek Ghosh and Paul Goldberg
In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference in Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI). 2022.
arXiv:2204.14051
Details about Contests to Incentivize a Target Group | BibTeX data for Contests to Incentivize a Target Group
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[6]
Truthful and near−optimal mechanisms for welfare maximization in multi−winner elections
Umang Bhaskar‚ Varsha Dani and Abheek Ghosh
In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Vol. 32. No. 1. 2018.
Details about Truthful and near−optimal mechanisms for welfare maximization in multi−winner elections | BibTeX data for Truthful and near−optimal mechanisms for welfare maximization in multi−winner elections
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[7]
On the welfare of cardinal voting mechanisms
Umang Bhaskar and Abheek Ghosh
In Proceedings of the 38th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS). Schloss Dagstuhl−Leibniz−Zentrum fuer Informatik. 2018.
Details about On the welfare of cardinal voting mechanisms | BibTeX data for On the welfare of cardinal voting mechanisms