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Strategic nomination in multiwinner voting

Supervisor

Edith Elkind

Suitable for

MSc in Advanced Computer Science
Mathematics and Computer Science, Part C
Computer Science and Philosophy, Part C
Computer Science, Part C
Computer Science, Part B

Abstract

In multiwinner voting, each voter specifies their preferences over available candidates (by ranking all candidates, or specifying which candidates they approve), and the goal is to select a fixed-size set of winners. An important phenomenon in real-life voting scenarios is that if voters are not familiar with the candidates, they prefer not to participate in the elections. However, once a voter chooses to participate, they tend to learn more about the candidates and therefore vote according to their true preferences. Thus, a candidate may benefit from nominating another candidate, if they believe that the new candidate's electorate will also support them. The goal of this project is to explore the complexity of the strategic nomination problem, for a variety of voting rules.