Nicholas Teh : Publications
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[1]
Weighted Envy−Freeness for Submodular Valuations
Luisa Montanari‚ Ulrike Schmidt−Kraepelin‚ Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 38. No. 9. Pages 9865−9873. March, 2024.
Details about Weighted Envy−Freeness for Submodular Valuations | BibTeX data for Weighted Envy−Freeness for Submodular Valuations | DOI (10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28847) | Link to Weighted Envy−Freeness for Submodular Valuations
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[2]
Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting
Edith Elkind‚ Svetlana Obraztsova and Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 38. No. 20. Pages 22633−22640. March, 2024.
Details about Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting | BibTeX data for Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting | DOI (10.1609/aaai.v38i20.30273) | Link to Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting
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[3]
Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting (Student Abstract)
Tzeh Yuan Neoh and Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Vol. 38. No. 21. Pages 23597−23599. March, 2024.
Details about Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting (Student Abstract) | BibTeX data for Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting (Student Abstract) | DOI (10.1609/aaai.v38i21.30488) | Link to Welfare Maximization in Perpetual Voting (Student Abstract)
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[4]
Envy−free house allocation with minimum subsidy
Davin Choo‚ Yan Hao Ling‚ Warut Suksompong‚ Nicholas Teh and Jian Zhang
In Operations Research Letters. Vol. 54. Pages 107103. 2024.
Details about Envy−free house allocation with minimum subsidy | BibTeX data for Envy−free house allocation with minimum subsidy | DOI (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2024.107103) | Link to Envy−free house allocation with minimum subsidy
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[5]
Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
Edith Elkind‚ Ayumi Igarashi and Nicholas Teh
In Algorithmic Game Theory. Pages 55–71. Springer Nature Switzerland. 2024.
Details about Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints | BibTeX data for Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
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[6]
Distributive and Temporal Fairness in Algorithmic Collective Decision−Making
Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Pages 2779–2781. Richland‚ SC. 2024. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Details about Distributive and Temporal Fairness in Algorithmic Collective Decision−Making | BibTeX data for Distributive and Temporal Fairness in Algorithmic Collective Decision−Making
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[7]
Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting
Edith Elkind‚ Svetlana Obraztsova and Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Pages 2246–2248. Richland‚ SC. 2024. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Details about Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting | BibTeX data for Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting
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[8]
Weighted fair division with matroid−rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness
Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh
In Mathematical Social Sciences. Vol. 126. Pages 48−59. 2023.
Details about Weighted fair division with matroid−rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness | BibTeX data for Weighted fair division with matroid−rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness | DOI (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.004) | Link to Weighted fair division with matroid−rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness
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[9]
Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
Edith Elkind‚ Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI). Pages 621–628. 2023.
Details about Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences | BibTeX data for Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences | DOI (10.3233/FAIA230324) | Link to Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences
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[10]
Weighted Fair Division with Matroid−Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh
In Algorithmic Game Theory. Pages xxiii–xxiv. Springer International Publishing. 2023.
Details about Weighted Fair Division with Matroid−Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness | BibTeX data for Weighted Fair Division with Matroid−Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness | DOI (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5) | Link to Weighted Fair Division with Matroid−Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
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[11]
For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
Jonathan Scarlett‚ Nicholas Teh and Yair Zick
In Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Pages 2466–2468. Richland‚ SC. 2023. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Details about For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods | BibTeX data for For One and All: Individual and Group Fairness in the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
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[12]
On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations
Warut Suksompong and Nicholas Teh
In Mathematical Social Sciences. Vol. 117. Pages 101−108. 2022.
Details about On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations | BibTeX data for On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations | DOI (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.03.004) | Link to On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations
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[13]
Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment
Edith Elkind‚ Sonja Kraiczy and Nicholas Teh
In Algorithmic Game Theory. Pages 490–507. Springer International Publishing. 2022.
Details about Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment | BibTeX data for Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment | DOI (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_28) | Link to Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment
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[14]
Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction
Shiri Alouf−Heffetz‚ Laurent Bulteau‚ Edith Elkind‚ Nimrod Talmon and Nicholas Teh
In Proceedings of the Thirty−First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence‚ IJCAI−22. Pages 24–30. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization. 2022.
Details about Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction | BibTeX data for Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction | DOI (10.24963/ijcai.2022/4) | Link to Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction